What Should Georgia Do?
The Daily Constitutionalist, Augusta, November 16, 1860
(Taken from Dwight Dummond, Southern Editorials on Secession, pages 242--47.)
The
most inveterate and sanguine Unionist in Georgia, if he is an
observant man, must read, in the signs of the times, the hopelessness
of the
Union cause, and the feebleness of the Union sentiment in this State. The differences between North and South have
been growing more marked for years, and the mutual repulsion more
radical,
until not a single sympathy is left between the dominant influences in
each
section. Not even the banner of the
stars and stripes excites the same thrill of patriotic emotion, alike
in the
heart of the northern Republican and the southern Secessionist. The former looks upon that flag as blurred by
the stain of African slavery, for which he feels responsible as long as
that
flag waves over it, and that it is his duty to humanity and religion to
obliterate the stigma. The latter looks
upon it as the emblem of a gigantic power, soon to pass into the hands
of that
sworn enemy,
and knows that African slavery, though panoplied by the Federal
Constitution,
is doomed to a war of extermination. All
the powers of a Government which has so long sheltered it will be
turned to its
destruction. The only hope for its
preservation, therefore, is out of the Union.
A few more years of unquiet peace may be spared to it,
because Black
Republicans cannot yet get full possession of every department of the
Government. But this affords to the
South no reason for a moment's delay in seeking new guards for its
future
safety. Such
is the
reasoning of cool-headed men in Georgia, who were a few days ago among
the most
conservative of Unionists. To them,
therefore, any line of policy will commend itself, which is in the
direction of
preparation for the coming change. In
this view the policy of retaliatory measures, as advocated by Gov. BROWN [1, below], is
entitled to
consideration and approval. The
particular measures, themselves, recommended by him, are not in all
respects
politic or right, and one of them is especially reprehensible. That one is the repeal of so much of the
Penal Code as gives protection within our borders to the “lives,
liberty, and
property of citizens of other States which have, by their legislation,
practically nullified the Fugitive Slave Law.” Apart
from the manifest unconstitutionality of such a proceeding, it would be
obnoxious to the moral sense of the Christian world.
It would introduce among us untold horrors of
mob violence and brutal outrage upon unoffending people.
It would put Georgia behind China, and on a
par with savage tribes in barbarous cruelty to strangers.
It would countenance atrocities as bloody as
the massacre of Christians by the Druses in Syria.
The proposition is sweeping in its terms, and
would embrace men, women, and children. But
the proposition is, no doubt, designed to
frighten
off the dangerous emissary of murder and robbery from the offending
States—not
to be literally enforced upon the innocent sojourners among us, thus
indiscriminately put under the ban of outlawry. For
the retaliatory measure suggested in his message there should
be more favor. The seizure of property
by way of reprisal, and discriminating taxation as a penalty for bad
faith,
can be sustained on principles of justice, of reason, and of
international law. But they are entitled
to consideration, and
will receive it from the people of Georgia, for a different purpose to
that
intimated in the message. The
recommendations
of the message are in a Union spirit, and with a view to preserve the
Union. The Governor says: It
is believed that
the legislation above recommended would tend to strengthen, rather than
weaken
the ties of Union between the States generally; as it would do much to
destroy
the sectional character of the controversy now pending between the
free and
slave States; and to narrow the issue to a contest between whole
sections of
the Union. Too
late! too late! is
the plain, emphatic reply to this. The
time was, when it was not patriotic to
despair of the Republic. The time has
come when the indulgence of hopes for its preservation is apt to delude
the
imagination and blind the judgment. The
“ties
of Union,” if by the term is meant ties of fraternal sympathy, can
never again
be strengthened, for they no longer exist to bind the two sections
together. They are broken—utterly sundered
between
portions of the South, and portions of the North. The
antagonism amounts not simply to
aversion,
but to bitter disgust and hatred. While
the Union lasts, as it may, for two, three, or four years longer, it
will be a
Union of necessity and of temporary convenience. It
will continue only long enough to enable
the southern States, whose people are resolved upon secession from it,
to make
such arrangements as a prudent, far-seeing, and practical people ought
to make,
for so radical a change in their political destinies. The
Governor proceeds: The
acknowledgment of the fact
that one State has the power to protect herself against the
unconstitutional
and aggressive legislation of another, without the aid of the other
sister
States, and without disturbing her relations with them, not only
destroys
geographical lines of division, drawn across the Union, and localizes
the
controversy between individual States, but
makes each
State pay a more just regard to the rights of every other State, in
view of the
fact that she cannot look for protection in the wrong, from her other
sister
States of her own section of the Union, whose sense of justice as well
as
interest under the proposed legislation would prompt to a consummation
of her
bad faith, and her unconstitutional enactments. Again,
rises up the response: Too late! too
late! What was once a hopeful prospect,
and might have been achieved by the legislation suggested, is now a
Utopian
dream. In the patriotic views of His
Excellency, the retaliatory legislation here urged would be operating
as a
depleting process, to cool the blood and relieve the frenzied brain of
northern
fanaticism, on the one hand; on the other, as an emollient plaster to
soothe
the fierce irritation of southern ultraism and disunion.
The remedy might have made some impression a
few years ago, when
it was advocated in these columns and
elsewhere in
Georgia. But now the remedy comes too
late. The disease is too deep seated. The election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency,
gives a tremendous onward
impulse to anti-slavery sentiment. So
far from the possibility of its being induced to recede, its steps are
now
nerved with new energy, and soon its arm will be clothed with the huge
power of
Executive patronage—a power that permeates through every nook and
corner of the
land—a power
exercised not less by seductive persuasions than by the intimidations
of
authority—a power not felt alone in populous cities and at commercial
points,
where wealth and commerce concentrate—but
felt along the far
stretching highways of travel, and in remote recesses, wherever a
government
contract is to be awarded, or a government soldier is marched. What army, flushed with long wished for
victory,
after many years of toilsome struggle and reverses, ever stopped its onward march when on the very
threshold of most tempting
plunder? Some
of the southern States see, in the tremendous popular majorities which
have
elevated Lincoln to the
Presidency, the huge mountainous waves that are beating down on the
South with
resistless force, and if she supinely waits for the deluge, must
engulph the
whole social system of the South in the relentless waters of
anti-slavery
fanaticism. With them the question is,
secession from the Union, and a self-defending, homogeneous southern
Republic,
or submission to the Union, and the fate of Jamaica and St. Domingo. The
conviction that this is the issue is ineradicable.
No soothing words, or honeyed promises, from
the lips of Mr. Lincoln
himself
can up-root this conviction. He rides a
wave he cannot control or guide to conservative results, even if so
disposed. Or if he should, for his short
term of
office, check its destructive tendencies, this very restraint will give
new
strength to its pent up fury, and it will carry into the same office,
four
years hence, a man of more revolutionary ideas. Whether
these apprehensions be well or ill founded, is now of small practical
consequence. They sufficiently possess
the minds of a majority of the people in several southern States to
render a
dissolution of the Union inevitable. It
is now a question only of time. The
Governor, in immediate
connection with the last quoted sentence, says: I
am no disunionist per
se; and would delight to contemplate our future glory as a nation,
could I
have the assurance that the Union, upon the basis of the Constitution,
would be
as durable as the hills and valleys embraced within the vast
territorial limits
of its jurisdiction. This cannot be the
case, however, unless each section of the Union accords to every other
section,
the full measure of Constitutional rights. The
writer cordially responds to this sentiment. But
how futile the hope that each section of
the Union will accord to every other section the full measure of its
Constitutional rights. Is it within the
bounds of a reasonable hope that Massachusetts will do this—or Vermont,
or Maine, or New York? In
short, in what northern State are those indications even of a
conservative
element, potent enough to regain the surface, and counteract the
dominant
influence which has so recently overwhelmed it? The
retaliatory measures of the Governor will not now work as panaceas to
restore
the Union to healthful action, and re-unite its sundered ties. But they may so work to prevent further
outrage upon the
persons of our citizens
traveling North, to reclaim their
slaves; to prevent further depreciations
upon
that species of property by the underground
railroad. This
policy
will operate in a way to diminish
the
dependency of our people upon northern looms,
foundries, and workshops, and teach them the
wisdom of encouraging their
own artisans and
mechanics. It
will prepare our people for
the great
change which is ahead in their governmental
affairs,
and render them, whether for peace or for war, more
self-reliant, more efficient, more prosperous. Such
results are not accomplished
in a day, nor in a year. An individual involved
in complicated business engagements cannot change his pursuits and his locality in that
time without
serious detriment. A man setting up in housekeeping
requires time to make his arrangements,
and to equip
his establishment. A community, however small and
homogeneous, requires time for thought
and preparation in inaugurating an
enterprise,
however peaceful and unopposed, which may involve outlay of money,
interruption
of business connections, and new schemes of polity.
How much more important, then, is time, deliberation,
and the amplest preparation, to an agricultural people like those of
Geogria,
in the contemplation of the question of change of Government. There is no goad of necessity urging them to
precipitate themselves out of the Union.
The necessities that will force Georgia out of the Union
are plainly
foreshadowed in the distance, and can be contemplated in all their
bearings. But they are not immediately at
hand. They are at least two years off. Until the Black Republicans obtain control
of the legislative departments of the Government, which they cannot do
earlier
than two years from the 4th of next March, no encroachment on the
Constitutional rights of Georgia, as specified in her platform of 1850,
is
possible. Therefore, her honor and her
obligations to her sister States, and to her own fame, do not require
her
secession short of that period. The
precipitate action of South Carolina might drag her unprepared into
disunion, but such conduct would
meet with deserved protest from the best citizens of both States. If
she were ready to go out at an earlier day, we would not question the
wisdom of
her acting more promptly. If she were in
a
condition
to secede to-morrow, and could do so without very great
injury to important interests and investments, we would, from the
reluctant
convictions of our judgment, be an advocate for immediate secession. The hopelessness of preserving the Union has
made disunionists, since the election, of thousands of Conservative and
Union
men. The necessities of the times, not
of their seeking, but in despite of their solemn warnings and
protests, have
made it imperative with prudent men in the South, to seek new guards
for their
future security. But immediate secession would be injurious to all, and disastrous to many interests in Georgia. Yet Georgia could secede with as little detriment to her immediate interests, and to her permanent prosperity, as any other southern State. The fact is they all require time and preparation for so important a stepthe Cotton States not less than the border States. The precipitate rush of one State out of the Union, when no others were ready to join, or to follow, would be destructive to that State—injure her sister southern States—strengthen the cause of the common enemy, and give him an advantage not easily regained. In fact, a State so acting would defeat her own purposes, bring upon her bring upon her people a lifetime of embarrassments and regrets, and render difficult the peaceful inauguration of a southern Republic, whether composed of five States or of fifteen, powerful and wise enough to be treated with as an equal by northern Republics, and by foreign monarchies, and rich enough to make treaties of commerce with her desirable to all nations.
1. The
Georgia legislature assembled in regular session, November 8, 1860. Governor Joseph E. Brown,
in his message to that body,
recommended that it enact laws authorizing the seizure of property of
any
citizen of States responsible for loss incurred by Georgia's citizens,
and
providing a tax of 25 per cent on all goods from States which refused
to repeal
their so-called personal liberty laws. See
Herbert Fielder, A Sketch of the Life and Times and Speeches of Joseph
E. Brown. [Footnote in the original.]
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